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FAYNF I). HFSS, an indi\idual.

Plaintiff 'Appellant and CrossAppellee.

Appeal Case No. 20050036

\ s.

JOin JOHNSTON, an individual.

Trial Court No. 050919801

Defendant Appellee and CrossAppellant.
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I his (Yuit has jjiisdiction o\ er this appeal pursuant to I hah 1 ode Ann, ^ •S-2a>(2)(i).
S I A IFMFN I OF ISSIFS ON (ROSS-AIMM Al, AND SI ANDARD Ol
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Did the disti iet court err In ruling that there was no \ lolation of Ctab R. ( i\. P 11
and denving defendant's motion lor sanctions'.'
\ trial court Y denial of Rule I 1 sanctions is re\ icw ed under a correction ol error
standard. Barnaul \. Suthlf. 846 P.2d 1.YH). 12-1 (Uah 1003 t; Morse \. FacFcr. 2000'
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fills case arises from a failed engagement between Plaintiff Mi. I less and
Defendant Ms. Johns to l. | R. at 2-n|. During the engagement period Mr. I less mcuircd

substantial expenses at Ms. Johnston's request and tor he" benefit, as well as. undergoing
a \ asectom\ procedure.

| R. at 2 6|. Following the termination of the engagement by

Ms. Johnston. Mi'. I less Filed a ( Ymplauil on November 5. 2005 in wInch Mr. 1less
sought to reco\et half cf the major costs inclined by Mi. Hess and loi Ms Johnston to

pa\ foi the cost of the re\ ersal ot Mi. 1less' \ aseclonn procedure. | R. at F0|

Mi. Iless

Complaint asserted claims lor unjust enrichment, conditional gill, promissory estoppel.
reasonable lehati.v. and breach of con trael. I R. at 60

()n Januarx 0. 2006. Defendant filed her Motion lor Sanctums and Motion for

Dismissal with Prejudiee along with supporting memoranda. | R. al 1^-32 |. I)etendant's
motions esscntialK asserted that Mr. Hess' claims were barred In the I tali Supreme
Court A decision in Jackson \. Brown. 004 If2d 685 <! tab DYY. w hich held that t 'tali's

cause of action for breach of an agreement to marry was abolished. ]R. at 1r»-32 |.

Plaintiff tiled a memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs motions on Januan. 2". 2.006.
and Defendant Fled a repl> memorandum on 1 ebruan 0. 2000. |R. al 34-54|. following
briefing, a hearing w as held before the 1lonorablc Dennis J. I rederick on April 1o. 2000.

| R. at 58. 8S|. B\ its April I I. 2000 Minute i ntrv. the trial court issued its decision
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, but denying Defendant's Motion for Sanctums.
| R. at 6 1-63 |.

I lie trial court signed a 1 mal ()rdcr Dismissing Action w ith Prejudice on

April 25. 2000, | R. at 64To|.

Plaintiff filed his Notice o\ \ppeal of the 1 mal *)rder Dismissing Action with
Prejudice on Ma\ 2s. 2006. [R. al "0-" 1j. Defendant filed her Nonce v^\'( ross-Appeal
on M;i\ 3 1. 2006. by w Inch Defendant seeks a re\ ersal of the trial court's denial o\'
Defendant's Motion for Sanctions. |R. at ~2|.
SI AlFMFNI OF FACTS

No additional facts arc ncccs>ar\ lor purposes ol tliis Brief ol ('ross- \ppellec.
Sl'MM\R\ Ol

AROl MINI

fhe trial court correctix denied Ms. Johnston's motion tor Rule i 1 sanctions. Mr.
less' claims are warranted under existing law . or. at the ver\ least. b\ a nonlrix olous

argument for the extension, modification, or re\ crsal of existing law or the establishment
ol new law and. therefore. Rule I 1 sanctions are inappropriate.

Contrarv to Ms. Johnston's argument, the I hah Si prcnie ( ourtY decision in

Jackson did not abolish all possible causes of actions arising Ironi the termination of an
engagement to be married. Rather, the Court's decision in Jackson abolished a ver\

narrow cause of action whereby a plaintill could ieeo\er damages tor the emotional
injury caused bv a terminated engagement, and seek to be put in the same financial

position the plaintiff would ha\ e been had the parties ma Tied. Mr. Iless is not seeking
either reined\. The Utah Supreme Court made il abundant 1\ clear that it was not
abolishing all possible claims that happen to arise from a terminated engagement.

Accordingly. Mr. Iless' claims are warranted b\ existing law. or, a! the \eiy leasi. by a
uon- lVi\ olous argumeni for the extension, modi heat ion. or iv\ eisal ol existing k. i. m Y
establishment oi new law and. therefore, the tnal court s denial of Ms. Johnston s Motion
for Sanction should be affirmed.
I.
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Regardless of u bet her Mr. 1less can prevail on his claims, sanctions pursuant to
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Ci\ iI Procedure aie inappro iriale because Mr. 1less" claims
arc warranted undci existing law . or. at the \ er\ least. h\ a nonln\ olous argument lor the
extension, modification, or reversal of exist ine law or the establishment of" new law

A

trial court's denial o\' Rule I 1 sanctions is reviewed under a correction of error slandaid.

Barnard \. Suthff. S46 P.2d 1220. I2>4(l'tah I 002 1; Morse \. Packer. 2000 Ul SO.Mb.

I 5 IYY1 102 I. As set forth below, the trial court did not error in deny nig Ms. Johnston's
motion for Rule 1 1sanctions.

Rule 11 provides that:
By presenting a pleading, w ritten motion, or other paper to the court . . . an
attorney or unrepresented part} is certify inu to the best of the person's
know ledge, information, and belief formed alter a inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances.

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
w arranted b\ existing law or b\ a nonfn\ olous argument for the
extension, modification, or re\ civil of existing law or the
establishment of new law .

t 'tali R. Ci\. P. Rule 11(b)(2). Rule 11 furthei pro\ ides that if "the court determines that

subdw ision (di has been \ it'la ted. the court may ... impose an appropriate sanction. . Y
I 'tab R. Ci\. P. Rule 11(c) (emphasis added). .Accordingly, in order lor sanctions to be
appropriate this Court must determine that Mr 1less" claims were not warranted b\
existing t tali law or bv a nonfm olous argument for the extension, modilication. or
rexersal oi existing 1bah law or the establishment of new law . 1Iowe\ er. e\ en if this
( ourt finds that the trial court erred on w hellier that standard has been met. sanctions are
not mandalon.

A.

Mr. 1 less* Claims Are Warranted B\ L\istin<> Law.

Simple put. the Utah Supreme Court A decision m Jackson \. Brow n. 0i)4 if 2d OS:
(Utah 100.S ). abolishing the common law cause of action for breach of a promise to

marry, does not abolish all causes of action arising from the termination of an agreement
to marry as argued bv Ms. Johnston. In Utah, prior to the Jackson ease, a cause of action

existed tor bread) of a promise to marrs. wInch allowed ; plaintiff to Teco\ er such
amounts as w ill compensate | plaintiff | for the benefits lost or delriinenls suffered because

of the breach, and the distress, mortiliealion. menial suffering, and injur\ to |plamlifl"s|
at lections w inch she has undergone in consequence thereof." Arbon \. Blyth. 1Yi P.
070. 070 (1 'tali 10 10) (rejecting challenge to jury nslruction describing the damages

plaintiff was entitled to if the jur\ found that the defendant had breached his promise to
niariA ). furthermore, under the breach of promise to marry cause ol action the successful
plaintiff was "entitled to such a sum as would place | plaint ill | in as iiomi a posilion

presumably as |plaintiff| would ha\e been in" had plainti "f married. Id. at 070-N0. It is
that cause of action that the ("ourt in ,lm k.\<>// understandably lejected ;.s being onto Jed

contrary to public policy ami not the proper \chicle to redress eniolional loss. Jackson.
004 P.2d at OS".

I he Court in Jackson, how e\ er. did not abolish all possible causes of actions
arising Ironi a cancelled engagement. In fact, the ('ourt in Jackson goes out oi its wav to
expressly state that, despite abolishing the breach ot promise to marr\ cause oi action.
""no injury to a_p Iamid I. upon proper show ing. goes unremedied'" and that "no
fundamenlal remedy is lost lo this o\ any oilier plainti If bv our decision that breach of a

promise to marry no longer exists." Id. Iemphasis added I

Justice Durham's statement

that "an\ losses suffered because ol [plaintil IY| reasonable reliance upon [defendant's

promise to marry her (such as normal expenses attendant to a wedding) may be
recoxerablc under a tbeorx ol" reasonable reliance or breach ol contract." simply suggests
the types of causes of action that remain \ lable. Id. al KS7. Associate (Jiiet Justice

Stew art Y concurring opinion only obieets to the last quoted sentence of Justice 1)urhanf *
opinion by stating that the "issue should be addressed, m my \ iew. only w hen it is
properly presented to this Court and properly argued by the parties." Id. at OSS i YC.J.
Stewart concurring). Justice Stewart does not challenge Justice Durham's statement, but
simply w ouid lea\ e the issue to be decided "w hen it is properY presented to Oils ( ourt."

Ms. Johnston completely ignores the fact that the court in Jackson affirmed the

lower court's refusal to dismiss the plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress
cause of action, w inch arose from the defendant's cancellation of their engagement. Id
al 0N7-XX. In doing so. the .fickson court expressly rejected the \ cry argument made by'
Ms. Johnston:

| Defendant j argues that because iplainti tfs| claim ot intentional infliction
of emotional distress is based upon the same alleged acts as her claim oi
breach of promise to marrv. "as one fails, so must the other." We disagree.
Id. at OSS icmphasis added). Accordingly. this court should reiect Ms Johnston's
argument that am and all causes of action arising from the termination of an agreement
to marr\ are barred b\ the Jackson case.

15.

Mr. Mess' Claims Are Nonlrivolous.

At the very least, a uonfri\olous argunienl for the extension, modification, or

reversal of existing law or the establishment ol new law can be made in support of Mr.
I less' claims, for a claim fo be "nonlrivolous" under Rule I 1. the claim does not \)CC(\ to

be successful, it need onlv be based on a "ivasonablc opinion" formed after "conducting
appropriate research" of the law. Barnard v. Suthff N4b U2d 1220. 12.VnUtali 1002).
furthermore. "[flic mere fact that the attorney's view of the law was wrong cannot

support a finding of a rale I I violalion." Id.
f ven i(dins ('ourt del ermines that Jackson does in tact prohibit Mr. I less" claims.
sanctions against Mr. I less are no! warranted inasmuch as his claims are based on

reasonable opinion formed alter conducting appropriate research of the state ol" I tali law .
It is clear that the Justices in Jackson, both m the main ogmiou and concurring o) uuon.
intentionally left the door open as to claims arising from a ternmiation ol'an engagement
situation. 0()4 P. 2d at 0S7-0XS. According Is. even if Mr. I less is w roug. sanations arc In
no means w arranted.

CONCLUSION

or the foregoing, icasoiis, this ( ouit should affirm the ti lal court's denial of Ms.
Johnston's Motion for Sanction'
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I o av oid repetition. Mr. I less u ill onlv respond to a few of points raised In Ms.
Johnston in her Brief of Appellee, first, as set forth above. Ms. Johnston's interpretation
of the Jackson case is absolutely contrary to the express language and holding of that ease
and. therefore, should be rejected by this ("ourt.

Second. Ms. Johnston makes much ol'the decisions of other jurisdiction, winch are
instrucliv e at best, but cert ami \ not con tail ling with this Court. Mr. I less' intent in citing

to non-l tali case law in his Appellate Brief was simply to demonstrate that, although
there is \erv little I 'tab ease law regarding claims relating to the termination of an

engagement, such claims are not unusual and courts have relied upon various grounds lor
granting relief in similar situations, including tor conditional gilt, promissory estoppelunjust enrichment, and breach of contract. Vv. e.g., I omko. Maine M.. \nnotation.

Rights in Respect o\~ engagement and (Yurtship Presents \\ hen Marriage f)oes Not
1 nsue. 44 A.I..R Ath I (200.Y. <)h\ iousl\. as demonstrated by the Jackson ease, the exact

scope of such claims under I hah law is an open question. The fact remains that, as
Justice Durham points out. "no injurv to a plaintitt. upon proper show mg. goes
unremedied" and that "no fundamental remedy is lost to this or any other plaintift by our

decision that breach of a promise to marry no longer exists." Jackson. 01)4 P.2d at 6X".
Just because Mr. Claims are of fust impression in Utah, does not mean that they lack
merit.

I bird, and Oually. Ms. Johnston's appeal to puhlk polic\ is misplaced. Mr. I less
does not dispute that a cause ol action tor breach ol an agreement to marry, as pointed oul
in the Jackson ease, is against public polie\. Id. I lowev er. it docs not follow that such
claims as promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment are hkew ise against public policy
jusl because they arise nut ol a terminated engagement. As is made clear in the Jackson

case, despite the strong public police that dictated the abolishment of the breach ofan
agreement to ma t\ cause of action, the Supreme Court relied on an equally strong public
policy to assure us thai "no injury to a plaintiff, upon proper .show mg. goes unicmedied"
and that "no fundamental remedy is lost to this or any other plaintiff In our decision that
breach of a promise to marrv no longer exists." Id. Such policy is rooted in the basic
tenants o\~ fairness ami accountability, and is fundamental to this State's judicial system.
Mi. 1less is not seeking damages for a broken Iieait. nor is he seeking m>mc
financial windfall putting bun in a belter position than when he began. Rather. Mr. I less

is simply seeking basic fairness and accountability tiom Ms. Johnston. 1he bottom line
is that Ms. Johnston caused Mr. I less to incur substantial debt during their courtship for
which Yls. .lohnsion should be required to take some responsibility. It certainly isn't fair
that \U. Johnston is able to simply walk away bom an engagement leav mg behind a
wake (4"indebtedness.

CONCLUSION

I or the toioe.oiug masons, as well as. the reasons set lorth in Mr. I less' Brief oI

Appellant, this (Yuri should rev erne the lower court's dismissal of Mr. i less" complain!
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